

China's Role in the Economy of Central Asia

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Abstract: This paper explores China's growing economic influence in Central Asia, focusing on its numerous investment projects and their effects on regional economies. The research highlights the gap in understanding the broader impacts of China's economic dominance on regional political ties and security dynamics. By reviewing historical trade relations between China and Central Asian countries and analyzing contemporary trade volumes, this study aims to clarify China's role in shaping the region's economic landscape. Through a comprehensive literature review and case studies, the findings reveal significant economic, political, and security implications, offering insights into China's expanding role in Central Asia.

Keywords: Investments, Economic cooperation, Trade relations, China, Central Asia

1. Introduction

For the first time since the 19th century, the five Central Asian states entered the world scene as autonomous players in the early 1990s. The five regional republics existed under the Russian-dominated political sphere from the time the Russian empire began its expansion program in Central Asia in the 18th century until the fall of the Soviet Union. The five Central Asian nations—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—became autonomous subjects of international law and established a new geopolitical zone in the world economy. The five Central Asian republics are no longer dependent on anyone and have partially assumed responsibility over their political and economic potential, which they aim to further develop by forming new alliances and partnerships with other countries. As a result, they have started to become more approachable to the powerful actors of their immediate neighbourhood; more accurately, the influential people are the ones who have begun to investigate the area [1].

China and Central Asia have had vibrant connections for nearly 30 years. At the beginning of the 1990s, China was a rapidly emerging, although still noncentral, actor in the international system; by the end of the decade, it was one of the leading powers globally. When Central Asian states gained independence in 1992, China was the world's 10th largest economy, accounting for 1.71% of the global GDP. In 2018, China had the world's second-largest economy, accounting for 15.86% of global GDP (in nominal terms), trailing only the United States and accounting for 10% more than Japan, the third-largest economy [2].

China, being no exception, has become today an indispensable commercial partner of the five states and at the same time a crucial, though not explicit, participant of the regional security agenda. China and Central Asian nations have formed a strategic alliance after over 30 years of development. Varied cooperation has been carried out in a variety of domains, including political, economic, cultural, and security [3]. These are the basis behind China's policy towards Central Asian countries. Geographically, China and Central

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Asia are neighbours. For Central Asian nations, China is a gateway to the sea, and CACs can help China establish internal communications with Europe and West Asia.

China and the Central Asian nations have maintained political relations for a considerable amount of time. Today, positive political connections have grown between China and Central Asia as a result of their shared perspectives on a wide range of domestic and global concerns [4]. From an economic point of view, China's role in the region is constantly growing. It remains a key trading partner for all Central Asian countries. Furthermore, China provides the region with substantial investments, primarily in the energy sector. China places great importance on raw materials, markets in Central Asia, metals, leather goods, and other commodities [5].

Central Asia is located in the center of the Eurasian landmass and serves as a crucial connection between Europe and Asia. In addition, it has a significant amount of natural gas and petroleum deposits. The economies of Central Asian nations are going through the same transition as China's. Due to their close economic proximity and the significant potential for economic complementarity, their bilateral trade and economic ties have grown at an expeditious pace [6]. It remains to be seen if the rapid expansion of commercial connections will result in economic integration. This research will look at potential routes for the growth of trade and economic ties between China and the Central Asian nations, as well as the likelihood of eventual economic union.

Despite all of the benefits listed above, China's relations with Central Asian nations do present certain difficulties, particularly with regard to debt dependency. Due to massive infrastructure project loans from Chinese financial institutions, Central Asian nations run the risk of becoming deeply indebted. The regional economies may be severely impacted by this, and their capacity to bargain for advantageous terms with China may be restricted. Furthermore, security worries state that the flood of Chinese capital and infrastructure projects into Central Asia may provide security risks such as cyberattacks, terrorist threats, and border disputes [7]. This could have an impact on China as well as the Central Asian nations by upsetting regional stability and economic activity. In the field of environment: deforestation, pollution, and water shortage could be negative consequences of China's investment in resource extraction and infrastructure projects in Central Asia, which could harm both communities and ecosystems of this region. According to cultural aspects there also might be some challenges related to Chinese influence spreading throughout the region, like Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in Central Asia may result in local traditions and practices being replaced and cultural homogenization.

The growing prominence of China as a prior actor in the economic development of the region makes significance of studying China's influence in the Central Asian economy important. Notional investments have been made in trade agreements, infrastructure projects, and economic alliances with Central Asian nations as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Policymakers, economists, and other stakeholders can evaluate the opportunities and challenges posed by Chinese investment and cooperation in Central Asia with greater ease if they are aware of the consequences of China's participation in the region's economy. It can also provide insight into how these trends might affect trade patterns, regional dynamics, and Central Asia's overall economic growth. Furthermore, as China's economic sway over Central Asia can have a significant impact on trade, geopolitics, and regional stability, it is imperative that the international community comprehend this influence.

The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows: the research will deepen our perception of the economic, social, and technological aspects of China's relations with Central Asian nations, providing insightful information about the scope of China's economic involvement in Central Asia, evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of this

partnership, and offer suggestions for enhancing the advantages and lowering the risks for the participating nations [8].

Literature review

This research will look at potential routes for the growth of trade and economic ties between China and the Central Asian nations, as well as the likelihood of eventual economic union. China's role in the economy of Central Asia has garnered significant attention in recent years, as the region has become increasingly important in global geopolitics and economic development. Central Asia, which includes countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is strategically located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. As a result, China has sought to deepen its economic ties with the region through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive infrastructure and development project aimed at enhancing connectivity and trade along the ancient Silk Road routes.

A number of scholars have explored the implications of China's growing economic influence in Central Asia. For example, Aleksandra Bolonina said that China is one of the most engaged actors in Central Asia whose presence is translated in its full scope by the Belt and Road initiative (BRI) or in our words, the new silk road initiative. Even before 2013, when China's and Central Asia's cooperation began to develop, the official launch of the BRI initiative caused for commercial activities that were previously unitary have received a designated orientation and have been indirectly colored politically. Enayatollah Yazdani who described in his writings also about Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) said: "In Beijing's view, the BRI is more than just an economic initiative; rather, it marks a new phase in China's relations with the CACs. The Belt and Road Initiative is probably going to be China's biggest contribution to the economic growth of Central Asia."

Research paper namely "China's Rise In Central Asia: The New Silk Road Economic Belt" published by Ramakrushna Pradhan analyzes China's rise, its ambitions in Central Asia, and the consequences for the region's future developments in this environment. It also looks into the potential for the Belt and Road Initiative to take on a new role in balancing power in Eurasia [9]. Similarly, Chi Zhang investigates the effects of China's economic presence in Central Asia on regional security and stability, but even if it has its advantages, we should not forget the disadvantages as well. While the potential of economic growth in the region is being stimulated by China's investments in infrastructure and energy projects, they can also raise concerns about political dependency and the risk of debt traps. In addition, Chi Zhang highlights the implications of China's Silk Road Fund for regional security dynamics, including the potential for increased competition with Russia and the United States.

The Laura Rachele Galeotti's work displays that Beijing consolidated diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian republics, leading to an exponential increase in trade relations, after the collapse of Soviet power. In a global scenario, what Beijing offers the five Central Asian republics is a convenient alternative to the US and Russian markets, but this choice has not only financial implications, but also clear political repercussions. The Chinese Communist Party is determined to preserve a conservative policy, guaranteeing the principles of non-interference in a solution where seemingly everyone wins [10].

China's Influence in Central Asia, a study by Dr. Pál Dunay, a professor at the Marshall Center, also showed that the United States competes with China and Russia on a global scale and that the United States should be present in regions of the world where either or both are engaged. This suggests that the United States should focus its attention primarily on Central Asia, given that the two big countries that border the region have the potential to be important allies, investors, commercial partners, and sources of security and assistance. It is fair to question whether the mainstream and widely popularized views concerning Chinese (and Russian) influence in Central Asia are founded. Namely that: the

contributions of the two states are enhanced by one another, but they also face competition for markets, capital, and power; China generally exerts influence through economic means, with Russia serving as the primary supplier of security; the main lines of influence are bilateral, with regional bodies serving solely as a supplement.

Furthermore, China's interest in the trade, energy, and water sectors was examined in the research (Lea Melnikovová, 2020). To be more specific, China wants to diversify its energy sources, which is why it is interested in searching Central Asia for oil and natural gas. Potentially, Central Asia might provide comparatively safe energy supplies that are less vulnerable to blockade threats, unlike those that cross the Malacca Strait. As a result, Central Asia serves as both China's energy supply and its energy transit area. China is eager to construct pipelines to Bandar Abbas, a city in southern Iran that is close to the Persian Gulf, via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. China would be able to ship oil from the Middle East to Xinjiang thanks to this massive infrastructure. Actual studies on China's position in Central Asia, including the energy, trade, infrastructure, oil and gas sectors, are cited in Pier Paolo Raimondi's research report- "Central Asia Oil and Gas Industry - The External Powers' Energy Interests in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan".

It is worth noting that not only China is involved in co-operation with Central Asia, but also CACs also co-operate in their own interests, such as for example in Bushra Fatima and Mubeen Adnan's research work that called «China's Economic Strategy and Challenges in Central Asia», Central Asia policy towards China is as follows: Secure themselves regarding China's expansionism, the prior area is the border issue, that is limiting and hold out against territorial claims of China; establish by means of a controlled way both economic as well as political and co-operation started by China. In addition, China's example of turning Central Asia into a communicator rope for its exported goods to Europe and the Middle East has increased profits in the areas of infrastructure and economy, allowing states and regimes to appear less dependent on China. All of these factors work together to extend cooperation to both domestic and international levels.

Another important aspect of China's economic presence in Central Asia is its impact on regional economies and societies. Concerns regarding the possible negative effects of Chinese investment, including social unrest, environmental damage, and unequal benefit distribution, have been voiced by academic Jiong Huang in 2022 in his work namely, "Risks and Strategies of China's Direct Investment in Central Asia from the Perspective of Big Data". The study literature on China's role in the economy of Central Asia highlights the complex and diversified nature of this relationship. China's investments pose issues regarding social inequality, environmental damage, and political dependency even while they have the potential to encourage economic growth and development in the region. More investigation is required to fully comprehend the implications of China's increasing influence in Central Asia for regional stability, security, and sustainable development.

By addressing these gaps, the research will contribute a perception of the economic, social, and technological dimensions of China's interactions with CACs, compare China's economic activities in Central Asia with other key actors in the region, such as Russia, the European Union, and the United States. This will provide a broader context for grasping China's role in the economy of Central Asia and highlight China's role in specific sectors or countries within Central Asia and the impact of China's investments and trade relations on the internal economy.

2. Materials and Methods

The thesis methodology integrates a detailed approach about literature review insights. The main focus is on the relationship between emerging China and Central Asian economies and selecting case studies of significant Chinese projects in Central Asia to show the practical consequences of China's economic influence. In addition, analyzing the results and challenges of these projects to obtain a detailed view of their impact. Finally,

applying qualitative techniques to interpret the opinions, perceptions and experiences of various stakeholders about China's economic role in Central Asia and analyze qualitative data to understand the socio-economic implications of China's actions.

3. Results and Discussion

1. Historical Context: The Silk Road's influence on the economic connections between China and Central Asia and historical trade interactions

Trade relations between China and Central Asian countries have a long history background dating back to the ancient Silk Road. The Silk Road is one of the knowable and valuable trade routes in history, it played a crucial role in strengthening the links between these areas economically and influencing the way that the various peoples interact socially and culturally. The transmission of technology and information between China and Central Asia was also greatly aided by the Silk Road. Through the Silk Road, innovations including papermaking, printing, and gunpowder were brought to Central Asia, resulting in notable breakthroughs across a range of industries in the area. China gained from Central Asia's expertise and technology in return, which encouraged a bilateral interchange of concepts and inventions that benefited both countries.

The cultural ties that bind China and Central Asia were also profoundly impacted by the Silk Road. A distinct and varied cultural landscape was developed in the area as a result of the interchange of goods, ideas, and cultures along the Silk Road, which fused various traditions and practices. Trade between China and Central Asia increased significantly during the 7th and 13th centuries during the Tang and Song dynasties in China. Horses, textiles, and valuable stones from Central Asia were exchanged for Chinese silk, porcelain, and spices.

As European countries consolidated their authority over Central Asian territory and dominated commercial routes, China's trade with Central Asia fell in the 19th century. However, as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, China has been attempting to reestablish trade links with Central Asia in recent decades. China is currently one of the main trading partners of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. China exports manufactured goods and technology to these nations while importing natural resources including minerals, oil, and gas.

2. Examining China's initiatives and investments in Central Asia

When considering connection between China and Central Asia, The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a crucial factor to take into account. In order to promote regional cooperation, Xi Jinping suggested in the fall of 2013 that China and the Central Asian republics collaborate to build an innovative Silk Road and strengthen their economic ties. He also recommended carrying out significant infrastructural initiatives. It is no accident that Xi Jinping chose to announce the beginning of his signature project in Astana, Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan, the largest nation in the area with the most developed economy, is essential to the BRI's execution. President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan has been actively promoting the national project Nurly Zhol ("the Bright Path"), which is a component of the Kazakhstan-2050 strategy and aims to develop the country's housing, education, transportation, logistics, industry, and energy sectors.

This initiative was spurred on by China. Essentially, the Kazakh proposal is a thank you for the new Silk Road project and aligns perfectly with the logic of the BRI. Not just Kazakhstan has shown support for the Chinese proposal. The political elites in other Central Asian governments, particularly those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have expressed a strong desire to receive Chinese investors. Public sentiment is far more reserved, despite the efforts of powerful individuals and their entourages to entice Chinese capital to their nations. Sometimes xenophobic attitude sparks protests, as happened in 2016 in Kazakhstan as well as in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Despite the challenges that come with this attempt, China is determined about increasing its presence in the Central Asian market nations. In that sense, the area serves China's interests both at home and abroad. First off, it supports China's economic expansion while simultaneously addressing the demands of its own development by broadening the source of its hydrocarbon imports. Commercial potential in the Central Asian market can assist China in managing its excess output, particularly in the steel sector. Beijing is thus allocating substantial funds for the building of hard infrastructure, such as power grids, airports, and trains. Since the early 1990s, China has been one of Central Asia's main trading partners, especially with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

It was responsible for 44% of Kazantzakis imports and 16.3% of its exports as early as 1992. As of April 2017, China had entered into contracts worth \$304.9 billion with its regional partners in a variety of industries, including trade facilitation, energy infrastructure, transportation, communication, and financial relationships. During the same time period, imports and exports increased by 23.2% and 16.5%, respectively. In the first quarter of 2018, the BRI nations accounted for over a third (29.1%) of China's total exports, up from 27.9% in the second quarter. China's total imports in the first quarter of 2018 came from 25.8% of the nations that were part of the Belt and Road Initiative. By 2025, China wants to have \$2.5 trillion in trade with the nations that are a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi made reference to this in 2015.

Furthermore, the China is the biggest energy consumer in the world. As a result, Chinese minors like China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have a keen interest in the oil and gas deposits in Central Asia. They have also made significant contributions to the building of pipelines that connect Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the two countries that currently export the most natural gas and oil respectively, to Chinese territory. Kazakhstan was predicted to produce 120 million tons of crude oil annually in 2020, accounting for 3.9% of global oil reserves. Nearly 600 million barrels of proven reserves are held by Uzbekistan, the majority of which are in the Bukhara and Khiva regions. With less than 600 million barrels, Ashgabat is the sixth-largest natural gas reserve holder in the world, yet Turkmenistan is a major player in the natural gas market. Additionally, Turkmenistan has demonstrated to have natural gas reserves of about 265 trillion cubic feet.

It is worth noting that there are 261 Chinese projects in Central Asia that are part of the BRI. The regions' two main BRI-related industries are trade promotion and industrial development. The overall number of projects in these domains is nearly equal to the total number of projects in every other domain put together. The majority of investments also go to these areas. Roads is the second most important sector in terms of completed projects, after the energy industry. However, electricity gets more funding than roads because of higher project sizes.

In terms of security, China and Central Asia now collaborate more. There are more military drills now, mostly with the three countries it borders: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. A portion of them have been completed inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) framework. A facility with several training centers and command post facilities has been created by China in the Tajikistani region of Nagorno-Badakhshan, close to the borders with Afghanistan. The governments ratified the underlying agreement in 2016. Built with Chinese funds, it is known as a border guard outpost and is manned by Chinese People's Armed Police personnel. It prevents terrorists from Afghanistan from traveling through Tajikistan to China and gives Beijing data on Afghanistan, which Beijing views as the sole significant external military threat to Central Asia.

One could characterize China's preferences for security cooperation as pragmatic. China prioritizes areas where it sees deficiencies and where developments in Central Asian security could affect China's security, above and beyond economic interests. They can be associated with the struggle against the "three evils," even though this may necessitate a subjective reading, like separatism. Considering prevailing trends, it is reasonable to

assume that China has taken advantage of the chance to expand its sphere of influence in light of its proximity to other countries, economic disparity, and growing variety of power and influence sources.

3. Possible hazards and difficulties that Chinese investments in Central Asia may encounter

This section focuses on the challenges that China faces in term of economical, political and social interaction with 5 Central Asian Stan' countries. The growing influence of China in the region is progressively altering the way the people view China. There have always been negative perceptions of China in the area. The Soviet propaganda machine disseminated "extremely negative clichés about China" prior to the 1980s. Conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 virus's origin have fueled anti-Chinese prejudice worldwide since the virus's spread. Some nations in Central Asia will keep employing regional frameworks as a hedging strategy to counterbalance China's rise as a result of China's growing influence in the region. China's efforts to establish itself as a responsible territorial player in Central Asia are further complicated by the anti-China sentiment that is currently sweeping the globe.

When a record number of individuals have negative opinions about China, the country's rising economic might and worldwide influence may be seen as threats. Public opinion puts pressure on the governments of Central Asia, despite the fact that these nations generally have positive relations with the Chinese government. For instance, in 2016, there were numerous demonstrations in Kazakhstan over a proposed land reform and anti-Chinese protests. Comparably, survey results from Central Asia show growing resistance in Uzbekistan against Chinese infrastructure and energy expansion in the area.

Furthermore, despite the disproving of the myth of "debt trap diplomacy," there is still concern that Tajikistan's vulnerability to debt distress and, more broadly, debt dependence in Central Asia will be increased by the BRI's lending mechanism. The BRI's development of economic reliance does not assist the participating nations in resolving the underlying issues with their economies. China is concerned about debt dependency, as are the receiving states. The COVID-19 outbreak has increased pressure on Central Asian nations to settle their debts with China, even though these nations already have low sovereign credit ratings.

Corruption is another risk that Chinese investments in Central Asia may face. One of the most corrupt regions in the world, Central Asia is known for its widespread use of bribery and kickbacks. Chinese investors may be faced with demands for bribes in order to conduct business in the region, or they may become entangled in corrupt practices. This can provide a serious obstacle. This could hurt the standing of Chinese businesses doing business in Central Asia in addition to raising operating costs.

Though interest-driven, identity issues also play a part in China's "new regionalism" in Central Asia. As an example, protesters at the Chinese embassy in Almaty, who sought the release of their supposed relatives imprisoned in Xinjiang, soured the goodwill maintained by investment. Events like these have exacerbated the hostility already present against China's expanding influence in the oil business. Identity-related issues do not now threaten China's geo economic strategy in Central Asia, given China's interest-based engagement with the region. Thus far, every nation in Central Asia has endorsed China's ethnic policy in Xinjiang. On the other hand, mistrust fostered by identification could eventually reduce China's influence in cooperative economic efforts. It might still be a barrier to China using its economic might to exert real influence over contentious matters, such how it treats the Uyghur people in Central Asian nations.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the expanding economic influence of China in Central Asia has significantly reshaped the region's development, with infrastructure improvements and economic growth as evident outcomes. However, this relationship presents both opportunities and challenges, particularly concerning debt sustainability, environmental impacts, and the protection of national sovereignty. The findings suggest that while Chinese investments offer critical financial support, they also risk creating economic dependencies and strategic vulnerabilities, especially in resource-rich nations like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This underscores the need for Central Asian governments to implement strong regulatory frameworks that safeguard long-term national interests, prioritize transparency, and promote sustainable development. Further research is necessary to assess the long-term socioeconomic and environmental impacts of Chinese investments and to explore alternative investment strategies that enhance regional self-reliance while maintaining economic partnerships.

Recommendations

China's future policies toward Central Asia will be shaped by the country's shifting internal dynamics, the views of Central Asian nations toward China, and the interactions China has with other regional superpowers. The following areas can be the primary focus of China's plan for Central Asia for the next ten years:

The first is to improve security cooperation between Central Asian nations even more. The security cooperation between China and CACs cannot be eased or reduced in response to developments in the region. Rather, it must be consistently deepened and enhanced. The SCO serves as Central Asia's security framework. It is imperative that China increase its security cooperation with Central Asian nations not only within the SCO framework but also on a bilateral level, expanding the scope of collaboration and raising the bar.

China ought to provide its Central Asian neighbors with more security support in light of the region's present security circumstances. Regarding hardware, China need to progressively assist Central Asian nations in modernizing their outdated facilities and equipment and bolstering their capacity for self-defense, particularly in the face of terrorism. China should enhance the software training program for Central Asian national police and military personnel as well as the coordination between China's and Central Asian national security forces.

The ongoing optimization of investment structure is the second. Building the "Belt and Road Initiative" between China and Central Asia has made increasing infrastructure investment a top priority, and this is progressively reversing the region's historically low level of infrastructure. Nonetheless, China's capital and technology investment structure and size should also be continuously optimized, given the existing economic structure and development level of Central Asian countries. Central Asia's agriculture, processing, and machinery manufacturing sectors are still relatively outdated. They are in serious need of financial support and innovative technology.

The third is using soft power to increase and improve interpersonal communication. In addition to deepening and broadening the people of CACs' awareness and understanding of China, strengthening and expanding interpersonal communication also contributes to the improvement of political mutual trust between China and these nations, progressively eliminating misconceptions about China. The first is to improve and increase social interaction. China should broaden the scope and scale of cooperation between Chinese universities and state colleges and universities in Central Asia, particularly their creative collaboration. The second is to consider the function of media related to tourism. China should strengthen its tourism cooperation with Central Asian nations, create more

easy travel routes, streamline the application process for travel visas, allow more media from both sides to be involved in the development of the “Silk Road Economic Belt,” and open up more border vacation destinations. Publicizing and reporting on the outcomes of the two sides' partnership is essential. In along with producing a number of special reports, reporting on China's progress and transformations as well as the warm sentiments of the Chinese people toward the people of Central Asia is also vital.

The third is to fully acknowledge the contribution Chinese businesses make to people's hearts and minds. Chinese businesses can be found all across Central Asia. Their actions and words reflect China's image and have a direct impact on how Central Asians view and feel about China. Chinese businesses should respect local customs and habits, follow the laws of the area, uphold corporate integrity, safeguard the environment, engage in more social welfare projects, take on social responsibility, and cultivate positive perceptions of Chinese culture among those who live there. In terms of investment, greater focus should be placed on the improvement of people's livelihoods in order for the citizens of Central Asian nations to benefit from the establishment of the “Belt and Road”.

The final objective is to bolster positive cooperation even more with other Central Asian significant nations. China and Central Asian nations will work together to advance the multilateral economic and trade cooperation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), support the construction of a trans-Eurasian transportation corridor, and allow Russia to further develop its own transit transportation potential and reap useful advantages—all while upholding Russia's traditional interests and realistic influences in Central Asia. China simultaneously aims to establish positive partnerships in Central Asia with the EU, Japan, South Korea, India, Turkey, and even the US in order to support Central Asian nations' increased economic development, increase their level of integration into the global economy, and provide greater security throughout the region.

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