

International Processes of the New Century and their Essence**Khabibullo Sadibakosev**

Doctoral researcher University of World Economy and Diplomacy

Annotation: International relations in the middle and second half of the 20th century were characterized by the fact that the traditional complex of factors underlying world politics, perhaps for the first time since the religious wars of the 16th – 17th centuries, was supplemented by an ideological component. Moreover, as the Cold War and bipolar confrontation developed, the ideological component tended to become one of the dominant (if not decisive) factors in world politics. Many analysts note that the Cold War was not only the next phase of the struggle for world domination, traditional for international relations, but also an ideological war designed to impose on the opposing side a certain way of life, value system, form of social structure, political regime, etc. As a result, during the Cold War, the ideological conflict acquired a largely self-contained significance, constituted the main nerve of confrontation within the framework of the emerging bipolar system of international relations. The opposition of the poles meant not just competition or tensions between two antagonists, but almost a holy war in which one of the two rival systems must win and the other disappear. The two opposing poles were playing an ideologically determined zero-sum game, in accordance with which the whole world was essentially divided into spheres of interest and ideological influence.

Keywords: International, Century, war, relations.

Therefore, with the end of the Cold War, the problems of the “end of history” and “the end of ideologies” have been actualized in the socio-political discourse of Western countries. In any case, it was asserted as an axiom that does not require proof that foreign policy is losing its ideological dimension. However, in reality, the ideological component turned out to be deeply integrated into the emerging “new” world order. The very domination of Western countries in the emerging system of international relations was legitimized largely by means of ideological tools. Moreover, within the framework of the clearly manifested itself by the beginning of the XXI century. Of the “unipolar moment”, Western countries, like a hundred and two hundred years ago, tried to play the role of the vanguard, projecting (including forcibly) their values and institutions (market, human rights, democracy) onto other societies, which (albeit in different degree) were ready to resist this and who, paradoxically, now defend a set of institutions and norms imposed on them by the West earlier (sovereignty, territorial integrity, diplomacy as the main form of interaction in the international arena, etc.).[1]

World politics arose at the junction of theoretical studies in the field of international relations, postulating the integrity of the political system of the world, with a significant contribution of the neoliberal tradition to the understanding of cardinal changes, ideas about the relationship between foreign and domestic politics, international political economy, analysis of international organizations, political science, where research in comparative political science was important. The set of theoretical approaches in international studies is a rather mosaic conglomerate. It is known that the conclusion of treaties that fix the limits of the use of force, the establishment of institutions designed to guarantee their observance, mutual obligations to respect each other's property - these are the elementary conditions for the formation of an international society. They do not lead to a complete liberation from the anarchy of international relations, but help to reduce its degree. By

creating and strengthening international regimes (in the field of security, trade, movement of goods and people, human rights, etc.), the international society streamlines interstate relations.

First, let us dwell on the most common approaches to the study of international relations, realism and liberalism. Consider the evolution of these classic paradigms.

The dominant place in the analysis of international relations belongs to realism and neoliberalism. ***Realism remains the dominant paradigm for all transformations of content and insists on the adequacy of its main provisions (conflict in international relations, national interests as the basis of world politics, the role of power and the effectiveness of force as ways to achieve and maintain it, etc.) to modern international realities.***

The tradition of political realism in the study of the history of international relations is associated with such thinkers as Thucydides, N. Machiavelli, T. Hobbes, K. von Clausewitz and others. In the XX century, a decisive contribution to the development of these traditions was made by the British historian E.-H. Carr and the American political scientist G. Morgenthau. Realists believe that the nature of international relations is anarchic, i.e. its features include the absence of supreme power, therefore, the states that are the main participants in international relations are forced to rely only on their own capabilities in interaction with each other. Such relations are based on the national interests of states, which are governed by the forces of the great powers. The preferences of states are formulated by their leaders, proceeding from their inherent perception of national interest, the essence of which does not fundamentally change. National interest is understood in terms of the strength of the state in relations with other states. Success is achieved by those leaders of countries who act wisely, using strategies that support or expand their power relative to other states. In the end, law or morality either serves the interests of the strongest, or is invisible in international relations. This was the case during the domination of ancient empires in Europe and other parts of the world; this existed at the dawn of the formation of modern states and will remain in the future. The essence of international relations is constant, because they are based on the unchanging nature of man himself, although as scientific and technical progress develops, social structures evolve, etc. they can take on new forms [2].

During the Cold War era, the popularity of neorealist positions in the TMT was reinforced by the bipolar structure of the interstate system, which determined the behavior of traditional actors on the world stage. However, with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the confrontation between the two superpowers, these positions were largely undermined. There has been a massive invasion of world politics by non-traditional actors, a new generation of conflicts has arisen, and security on the planet has ceased to depend only on the configuration of the international system. The dissemination of the latest means of communication and information has made interstate borders permeable. Civilizational, cultural, religious factors and the self-identification of new actors began to play a significant role in world politics. This led to the fact that in the theory of international relations, the postmodern approach is becoming more widespread. Under these conditions, a new version of realism appears, one of the first exponents of which was Harvard University professor S. Huntington, who in 1993 came up with the idea of a “clash of civilizations”. States as the main actors in world politics are being replaced by civilizations - cultural communities that differ from each other in history, language, traditions, but most of all in religion. Despite the mutual intertwining and mixing, the main civilizations (Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic Orthodox, Latin American and, possibly, African) are real communities with virtually dividing borders. Communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor, but Azerbaijanis cannot be Armenians, Huntington illustrates his point. Huntington shares with the realists the position that the subjects of world politics predominantly operate in conditions of anarchy, and

there is almost nothing that would hinder their desire for power and domination. For example, international economic institutions are used by the West to protect its own economic interests and to impose economic policies that are beneficial to other nations. In turn, international security institutions exist for the implementation of political domination by the West[3].

Thus, we are talking, in fact, about a new post-classical realism. Maintaining at the basis of their reasoning all the main postulates of the paradigm under consideration (concerning the nature of international relations, the processes dominant in them, participants, their goals and means, and finally, the future of these relations), its supporters shift the center of gravity in the study of international relations from the analysis of interstate interactions to factors and processes of a sociocultural order. Liberalism is undergoing a similar evolution.

As you know, *liberalism is based on two ideas - on the unity of the human race, universal values and ideals, as well as on the possibility and necessity of changing the nature of international relations in the spirit of humanism and human rights.* International relations are becoming more and more manageable under the influence of public opinion and the purposeful activities of an expanding circle of participants in international relations. Along with states, the activity of non-state international actors - intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, firms, enterprises and banks, as well as heterogeneous organized groups and individuals - is gaining in importance.

The main processes dominating in international relations are not conflicts and wars, not a confrontation of national interests, but cooperation and integration, conditioned by the growing interdependence of the world and the increasing awareness of people of their common interests. The world does not automatically become better and safer, which requires cohesive actions from the participants in international relations to regulate them. The main regulators are legal and moral norms. In this paradigm, there is an idealistic component, which has a long tradition, within which "utopianism", "legalism" and moralism are distinguished.

The other two versions of the liberal paradigm are neoliberalism and postclassical liberalism. Neoliberalism includes, for example, a trend that is based on the concept of economic interdependence. From the point of view of its supporters (Keohane, R. Cooper, Nye), the policy of states in international relations is determined by internal economic interests. At the same time, the growth of interdependence creates common economic interests of all states. This unity strengthens their cooperation. Countries work together to increase their potential economic benefits and reduce losses. Their policies are driven by rational interests. The growth of economic interdependence not only changes the tasks and behavior of states on the international stage, but also reduces the role of their military power.

The last decade of the XX and the beginning of the XXI century. became a time of rapid development of constructivism - a new trend in international political science. It has been customary to use the term constructivism in international political science since 1989, when N. Onaf's work "*The World of Our Creation: Rules and Regulations in Social Theory and in the Theory of International Relations*" was published by the University of South Carolina, in which the author first used himself this term. Constructivism gained recognition in the scientific community thanks to its appeal to previously poorly studied aspects of international life, the novelty and originality of the propositions put forward, criticism of traditional paradigms along with the desire to find certain compromises in them. Constructivists (in international political science, E. Adler, M. Barnett, T. Christiansen, M. Finnemore, J. Chekel.) Rely in their views on the provisions of the theory of social construction of reality developed much earlier, on sociological

approaches in research international relations. From the point of view of constructivists, the meaning of the world is given by norms, rules, cultures, values and ideas, i.e. ideal factors, which are ultimately primary. Institutions are formal organizations created to disseminate norms as the result of social agreements. They do not exist outside the ideas of the actors, their ideas about the way in which the world functions. Because of this, the generally accepted “meaning” of institutions is interpreted within a shared normative framework. The existence of institutions depends on regulatory and constitutional rules. The role of regulations is to streamline certain activities. The attention that constructivists pay to what they call co-constitution, i.e. mutual formation of institutions and agents, the priority they give to the constitutive functions of rules and norms over regulating ones - all this has rather serious consequences for the understanding of international relations. In other words, constructivists admit the likelihood of changes in the very fundamental foundations of the functioning of international relations and world politics. This is opposed by the supporters of realism. Realists are interested in what remains, unchanged, not changing. They focus, for example, on the similarities between the policies of the times of Kissinger, Metternich and Thucydides, treating change as anomalies. Constructivists, on the contrary, highlight such changes and analyze how the goals, behavior and even the very nature of states are formed in the historical process by the dominant political ideas and social norms (M. Finnemore). ***Constructivists believe that national-state interests cannot be derived simply from the distribution of military or economic power, that there is also a social component of such power.***

According to constructivism, as long as the planet is institutionally divided, states as international actors will retain a special role in world politics. This is explained not by the fact that they are doing well with their tasks (ensuring the safety and well-being of citizens, individual rights and freedoms, etc.), but by the fact that the state, as a form of political organization as a whole, is increasingly revealing its dysfunctionality, moreover, the development of this form gave rise to many ineffective, even failed states. However, if you are not a state, then in world politics you are nobody, which is understood by the national movements fighting for liberation and equality. ***"The fact that hopelessly weakened and failed states can be re-established as states rather than reorganized in any other way (such as colonies) indicates strong cultural support for statehood and the illegitimacy of other political forms."*** States exist because they are supported by the great world culture [4].

Debates on the theory of international relations postulated a positive impact on international relations of the emerging unipolar moment and the prevailing liberal consensus. By definition, an anarchic (Hobbesian) international environment was contrasted with increasingly orderly relations within the framework of the emerging liberal unipolar, where the US and Western countries were to play the role of the supreme arbiter in shaping and approving the rules of the game, as well as in enforcing them. The new world order was based on a completely definite and universal in its claims liberal ideological platform [5]. In the context of the triumph of the liberal ideological paradigm, it was asserted as an axiom that liberalization is necessary to ensure universal peace and security. Economic interdependence and international institutions are alternative liberal strategies aimed at softening the policies of states, creating a more peaceful and cooperative international environment. From the point of view of supporters of liberal approaches, attempts to change the world order are possible. But within the framework of the existing system of international relations and the dominant structures of political discourse, they will be “limited and ordered in ways that preclude drawing any analogies with the past. Three factors can be distinguished: there is a gradual shift, not a change in the centers of power; unleashing a large-scale war between the leading powers is ruled out, since such a clash cannot serve as an effective means of changing the system; and numerous international organizations create unprecedented obstacles for countries that are claiming to expand

their influence” [6]. The combination of all these factors limits the ability of states dissatisfied with the existing balance of power to change the existing system and is an obstacle to attempts to change the existing world order. The dense intertwining of established rules and institutions supports the maintenance of the existing status quo. This idea is supported by the results of scientific research and was summarized by J. Ikenberry's famous statement about the inherent “blocking effect” (or “rut effect”) in institutional systems, which provides resistance to change. These factors are actively used by those who aim to preserve the status quo (a practically formed unipolar liberal world order) and create almost insurmountable problems for potential revisionists.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance of the Eastern Bloc, the world in the early nineties, for the first time in the new century history, fell into unipolarity, with a pronounced dominance of the United States and the military-political alliance NATO. The United States confirmed its political and military domination both economically, by imposing and pursuing the policy of the Washington Treaty, which essentially represents the Morgenthau Plan for the countries [7], first in Latin America, and then in the former socialist world. The basis of the Treaty - the assumption of the spontaneous emergence of markets - a well-known "*error of spontaneity*", which more or less all the transforming countries adhered to, and which could not have good consequences [8].

This second process significantly accelerates the current that has begun, directing the world order towards multipolarity. Until recently, instead of the almighty United States, there are already several world powers, of which the United States is still the leading, but without the ability, as before, to independently determine the main processes concerning the correlation of world politics and international relations. America can still provoke crises in different parts of the world, but not end them in its own way. Examples are the *Ukrainian and Syrian crises, and in terms of soft power, the WikiLeaks and Snowden cases*.

Trump's victory in the US presidential election and Brexit are two new key developments indicating that, on the one hand, multipolarity already exists, and this is changing the policy of the leading Anglo-Saxon powers. On the other hand, even among them, who had the greatest benefits from neoliberalism and the new order, an ordinary person, according to the theory of the modern world system of I. Wallerstein, decided to rebel and overthrow this imperialist policy, which is created by a narrow layer of the globalist elite.

In connection with Trump's victory and Brexit, some of the elite in Washington and London are now more willing to seek a compromise with Moscow (and more broadly with the BRICS). But it is unlikely that there will be a serious convergence of the interests of Washington and London, on the one hand, and Moscow, Beijing and other centers of power. This is primarily a tactical readiness for cooperation of interested parties ("trade"). Of course, this is also a chance in the Balkans, specifically for Serbian interests.

China through the NSR establishes a direct geo-economic and transport line of communication with Europe, including with the important region of the Danube basin. Thus, Serbia receives additional opportunities for developing relations with China, for connecting with countries in the region, for its own development, especially taking into account the Danube route, road corridors that pass through its territory, as well as the Piraeus-Budapest high-speed railway project. The fact that Serbia is militarily neutral and not an EU member becomes more important when it comes to China.

Western scholar's views on China's rise are as follows:

First, China is seeking to squeeze the U.S. out of the Asian region and is preparing for a possible serious confrontation in the future. The gradual modernization of the PRC's military forces and the increase in its military budget, as well as its efforts to resolve the disputes around the islands in the East China Sea by force, are among them. At the same time, in order to weaken the US influence in Asia, it promotes concepts such as “a new model of international relations” and “security in Asia by Asians” through platforms such as the SCO and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia;

second, China seeks to undermine the "liberal world order." These are the requirements for reforming the Bretton Woods institutions, the creation of new alternative international economic and financial institutions (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank, One Place, One Way). For example, in 2019, the European Union classified China as a “systemic competitor that promotes alternative global governance”; [9]

Third, the PRC considers human rights and freedoms to be the greatest threat to its political system and opposes their spread around the world; [10]

Fourth, in order to weaken U.S. global hegemony, Beijing has recently sought to spread false information (disinformation), deception, coercion, spread corruption, and create a positive image of China among the Western public. Therefore, the American Expert L. Diamond describes China as a "sharp power". [11]

Today, in conditions when “the world is undergoing a transformation due to large-scale transboundary activity”, when new actors are emerging that challenge the modern political organization of the world, it is important to use such methods of influencing public consciousness that would be a sufficiently effective tool to achieve the set goals in foreign policy activity of the state[12].

The mechanisms of public diplomacy play an important role in this regard, one of the main tasks of which is to strengthen the deterrent factor of the forceful solution of problems in international relations. In modern conditions, public diplomacy is becoming an important structural component of the strategy of the leading actors in world politics, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In their quest for global domination, the United States and NATO seek to use a flexible and comprehensive strategy of military-political influence. Along with the traditional methods of forceful influence, political strategists of the Alliance pay great attention to improving the use of fundamentally new instruments, among which the mechanisms of “soft power” are in the first place. Their most important advantage is the ability not to force the opponent to take certain actions, but to attract him to your side with the help of persuasion, while creating a psychologically beneficial atmosphere of mutual understanding. As professor at the University of Southern California Philip Seib notes in this regard, "NATO must channel its influence through" soft forms "in order to justify its hard power"[13].

At the present stage, the use of soft power mechanisms as a tool of NATO public diplomacy presupposes the formation of certain ideological attitudes among the wide international community, as well as the formation of a positive image of the Alliance as a transparent, modern and successful international organization friendly towards most other international actors. One of the features of the use of "soft power" by the North Atlantic Alliance is the impact on various segments of civil society in other states. The priority area in this regard is the various formats of work with the youth audience. To this end, the structures of the Alliance organize and finance a set of events, including special scholarship programs, holding conferences, seminars, workshops, summer schools with a targeted focus. Examples of this kind include the regularly functioning Summer School in Slovakia

and Ukraine, within the framework of which a program for the training of specialists in the field of European and Euro-Atlantic integration is being implemented. Currently, within the framework of the implementation of this direction, the Alliance has created a whole system of interacting organizations, known as the "Young NATO Network"[14].

One can argue about exactly when the decline of the "era of liberalism" began - during the crisis of 2008–2010. or much later, in 2016, when the "black swans", contrary to predictions, swirled over the horizon of world politics (Brexit, D. Trump's victory in the US elections). But, apparently, the peak of the influence of liberal ideology and, in general, the long cycle of deep ideologization of international relations, which began in the middle of the 20th century, has passed. A significant number of researchers have recently started talking about the emergence of polycentric tendencies in contemporary world politics[15]. The global balance of power is changing literally before our eyes[16]. Financial and economic crisis of 2008–2010. spurred the processes of redistribution of influence and contributed to the growth of the potential of a number of non-Western centers of power (China, India, Brazil, Russia), clearly demonstrated the inability of a narrow circle of Western countries responsible for global regulation over the past decades (and in a broader sense, the entire XX century) , to exercise effective global governance, to cope with the challenges of the era.

Conclusion

Thus, in conclusion, it should be noted that the evolution of theoretical approaches to the study of international relations is characterized not only by changes, but also by continuity. The newest directions have not got rid of inter-paradigm disputes. But at the same time, the transformation of classical paradigms does not prevent the preservation of their fundamental postulates. Methodological attitudes are becoming more and more diverse, but positivism and rational choice retain a fairly strong position. It also includes the ideological and theoretical preferences inherent in any study of international relations. At the same time, special attention should be paid to the fact that one of the functions of the theory of international relations is to prevent analysts from excessive self-confidence and hasty assessments, and practitioners from hasty and large-scale actions based on certain expert conclusions or recommendations. At the same time, it should be noted that knowledge of the basic provisions of theoretical paradigms is only a precondition on the way to the study of international relations.

In our opinion, *the "world order" Russian political scientist P.A. Tsygankov's definition of the world order as "a set of principles governing the interactions of the participants in international relations" is much simpler and clearer* [17]. Knowledge of the above ideological directions will help advance in understanding their nature and trends and, accordingly, in understanding the vicissitudes of international politics, because such a combination will provide an opportunity to navigate the rapidly evolving international realities. In the conditions of turbulence, which inevitably arises due to the growing pressure of the revisionist powers and the resistance of the former unconditional leaders of the world system, as well as in the context of the uncertainty, blurring of the rules and regulations prevailing in world politics, a return to rational and de-ideologized realism (albeit on how updated the theoretical basis) seems to be a very likely outcome. Historically, this is, in a sense, a return to "normalcy." Let it be a "new normality". Donald Trump's victory in the presidential elections in the United States and a certain revision of American foreign policy by him is highly likely to accelerate both de-ideologization and a realistic trend in modern world politics. The unconditional dominance of the liberal paradigm on a global scale is gradually coming to an end. This process is accelerating due to the end of the "unipolar moment" in world politics. Moreover, perhaps for the first time in recent decades, real prerequisites are emerging for

the de-ideologization of international relations. The world is entering a turbulent era formed by a polycentric world order. And one of the main features of which is likely to be the strengthening of political realism as an intellectual dominant in decision-making in a dynamic and much more uncertain than in recent decades, international environment.

Literature

1. Ананьин, О.И.; Р.Г. Хаиткулов и Д.Е. Шестаков. Вашингтонский консенсус: пейзаж после битв // *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*, 2010, № 12, с. 15–27.
2. Петрович, Д. Геополитика Балкана, Београд: Институт за међународну политику и привреду, 2014
3. Bukvić, R. Transition in Serbia: Foundations, Results and Perspectives / 4th International Conference on European Studies, Social, Economic and Political Transition of the Balkans, Tirana: Epoka University, 2013, pp. 556–572.
4. Macner, E. Monopolarni svetski poredak. O socioekonomiji dominacije SAD / пер. с англ. М. Корећни. Београд: Dosije, 2003.
5. Petrović, D. and N. Tomić-Petrović. Geopolitical aspect of the new Silk Road, Danube and the new silk road, ed. by D. Dimitrijević, Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economies, 2016, pp. 108– 118.
6. Reinert, E.S. Globalna ekonomija. Kako su bogati postali bogati i zašto siromašni postaju siromašniji / пер. с норв. I. Rajić. Београд: Ћогоја штампа, 2006.
7. Wallerstein Immanuel. World-Systems Analysis. An Introduction, Duke University Press, 2004.

References

1. Buzan B. From international to World Society? English school theory and the social structure of globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. P. 237.
2. Косолапов Н. Международные отношения как специфический тип общения // *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*. 1999. №6.
3. Хантингтон С. Столкновение цивилизаций // *Полис*. 1994. №1.
4. Финнемор М. Нормы, культура и мировая политика с позиций социологического институционализма // *Международные отношения: социологические подходы*. - М., 1998.
5. Ikenberry J. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
6. Уолфорт У. Возвращение реальной политики // *Россия в глобальной политике*. 2015. Июль-август. URL: <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Vozvrashchenie-realnoi-politiki-17636>
7. Reinert, E.S. Globalna ekonomija. Kako su bogati postali bogati i zašto siromašni postaju siromašniji / пер. с норв. I. Rajić. Београд: Ћогоја штампа, 2006.
8. Macner, E. Monopolarni svetski poredak. O socioekonomiji dominacije SAD / пер. с англ. М. Корећни. Београд: Dosije, 2003, с. 51.
9. This approach is particularly reflected in the EU's 2019 EU-China - A Strategic Outlook Concept. Email address: <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf>

10. John J. Mearsheimer. Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order. *International Security* (2019) 43 (4). P. 7–50; Fareed Zakaria. The New China Scare. *Foreign Affairs*. №1, Vol. 99, 2020; C. Nana de Graaff, Tobias ten Brink Inderjeet Parmar. China's rise in a liberal world order in transition. *Review of International Political Economy*. Volume 27, Issue 2 (2020) p: 191-207; Huiyun Feng Kai He. China's Institutional Challenges to the International Order. *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2017, pp. 23-49; Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline," *International Security* 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 41–72, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41289688>; Mark Beeson, Fujian Li. China's Place in Regional and Global Governance: A New World Comes Into View. *Global Policy*. Volume 7, Issue 4 November 2016 Pages 491-499; Matthew P. Funaiole, Bonnie Chan. Understanding China's 2021 Defense Budget, March 5, 2021. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-chinas-2021-defense-budget>; China: A Threat to Western Democracies. *Observador*. 10 may 2020. <https://observador.pt/opiniaao/china-a-threat-to-western-democracies/>; Maj Daniel W. McLaughlin. Rewriting the Rules: Analyzing the People's Republic of China's Efforts to Establish New International Norms. USAF. March 08, 2021.
<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2528526/rewriting-the-rules-analyzing-the-peoples-republic-of-china-s-efforts-to-establish/>; Dr. Benjamin The Ern Ho. Chinese Vision of a Rules based Order International Order with Chinese Characteristics. *Indo-Pacific Perspective*. 2020, pp. 12-15 <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/06/2002546903/-1/-1/1/HO.PDF>
11. China Exerting 'Sharp Power' Influence On American Institutions. December 19, 2018. <https://www.hoover.org/news/china-exerting-sharp-power-influence-american-institutions>
12. Лебедева М.М. Публичная дипломатия в урегулировании конфликтов // *Международные процессы*. 2015. Том 13. № 4(43). С.45–56.
13. Pagovski Z.Z. Public diplomacy of Multilateral organizations: the cases of NATO, EU and ASEAN // *Fuguero Press*. 2015.
14. Манойло А.В. Психологические операции: модели и технологии управления конфликтами. // *Политэкс (Политическая экспертиза)*. – 2008. – № 3. – С. 62–73.
15. Россия в полицентричном мире. / Под ред. А.А.Дынкина, Н.И.Ивановой. М.: *Весь мир*, 2011, С.11–68, 157–162
16. Основные показатели развития мировой экономики в 2014 г. // *Год планеты. Экономика. Политика. Безопасность*. Вып. 2015 г. М.: *Идея-Пресс*, 2015, С.428–431.
17. П.А.Цыганков Исследования проблем миропорядка: теоретические трудности, расхождения трактовок. *Вестник Томского государственного университета Философия. Социология. Политология*. 2018. № 41. С.194- 202.