

Criteria for the Formation and Development of Political Capital

Azimov Sirojiddin Yuldosh Ugli

UzSWLU "International relations, political problems of world and regional development" Basic doctoral student

Annotation: This article discusses the peculiarities, historical foundations, pros and cons of the formation of political capital. The article also discusses the specifics of the development of political capital.

Keywords: positive political capital, international relations, negative political capital, power, public awareness.

INTRODUCTION

In ancient times, the ancient Greek philosophers, in the course of lengthy reflections and discussions, offered their contemporaries and descendants a matrix of possible types of organization of political power. They proceeded from the presence of three ideal and, accordingly, three perverted (ugly) incarnations: monarchy (autocracy), which in a distorted form takes the form of tyranny, aristocracy (a distorted version is oligarchy) and democracy (the product of degeneration is ochlocracy). The matrix turned out to be successful and remained in its main features for many centuries, having survived to the present day, which, as you know, rarely happens [1].

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Of course, time has left noticeable "notches" on this matrix. Soon after its appearance, it became obvious that pure forms of political organization, although possible, are not very common. Every now and then, hybrid systems developed and flourished, in which logically seemingly difficult-to-compatible options merged. The monarchy was often combined with the aristocracy and the oligarchy, and even quite coexisted (and coexists) with democracy. In turn, the oligarchy, under certain circumstances, used in its own interests not only monarchical, but also democratic institutions. The democratic forms of the political system also looked different, depending on the level of development of the corresponding societies, and even the incorporation of elements of autocracy [3].

But the most significant adjustments to the matrix proposed by ancient thinkers were made by another phenomenon, which was once not very important, but acquired over time not only significant, but in many respects dominant importance - the type of relationship of the majority of citizens to power and its political institutions. The nature of these relations began to increasingly leave an imprint on the course of the political process and its outcome. And it was determined not only by the form of institutions of power, but also by a number of other circumstances. Without their understanding and taking into account, the analysis of the political situation, and even more so its forecast, is practically impossible.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The studies carried out in this area have already yielded notable results. But much remains to be done. To begin with, I will briefly reproduce what is now beyond doubt.

Real politics is formed in the course of a political process, which is based on the relationship between power structures and society, and hence, individuals. These relations not only form a bridge between the subjects and objects of the political process, but also modify them to a large extent [4].

The interaction of power structures, society and individuals is realized in the form of impulses, which, in turn, are divided into descending (from power) and ascending (to power), institutionalized (coming through formalized channels) and informal, direct and indirect (through civil society institutions). At the same time, there is a minimum level of interaction, below which the relationship between power structures, society and individuals falls apart, which entails the destruction of the social system.

The nature of the interaction of individuals, society and power structures depends on the historically established socio-cultural environment. This means that the political process is not of the same type. Consequently, it is obviously unacceptable to ignore the specifics of the relationship between individuals, society and government in societies belonging to different civilizations and at different stages of development. But it is equally unscientific to view these relationships as invariants. Despite the high inertia, changes are constantly accumulating in them, which over time make serious adjustments to the established system. One of the most important products of such relationships is the presence in the political process of what in recent years has come to be called political capital.

By stating this, I am leaving the sphere of the universally recognized and moving on to an area that requires additional reflections and assessments.

The concept of “political capital” has not yet been established everywhere. In cases where it is resorted to, it means such a state of mass consciousness in which a significant amount of competencies is delegated to the institutions of political power and the persons who lead them. Thus, society recognizes their right to make generally binding decisions, as well as to carry out various, including coercive, actions necessary to implement these decisions, and, accordingly, declares its readiness to obey them. On this basis, such prerequisites for the political process as the legitimacy of the political system (regime), law-abiding population, and much more are formed [6].

Obviously, what has been said above gives rise to many questions that require reasoned answers. And not all of them are as obvious as it might sometimes seem.

I'll start with the objective origins of political capital. There is no doubt that they are based on the real interest of the individual, the group and society as a whole. However, the phenomenon described by the term “interest” is also extremely complex in itself. It—regardless of the level at which it arises—has a real content conditioned by objective needs.

It is extremely important to correctly determine the ratio of stability and mobility of political capital. And the point here is not only the accumulation of theoretical knowledge. Practical considerations are no less important. Many political elites, having come to power due to the presence of political capital, are inclined, especially if it is significant, to consider it absolute and even eternal. Hence the lack of proper care for its safety and growth [2].

Meanwhile, political capital, although it has a certain, and sometimes high stability, is mobile. The degree of this mobility depends on many reasons and in some situations can be very significant. The results of inattention to this circumstance are unequivocal: the erosion of political influence, the loss of positions of power, and sometimes the collapse of the regime.

In a number of cases, the stability of political capital is determined by the type of system of power, its correspondence (or inconsistency) with the level of development of the social organism. But not only. History knows many examples of how such correspondence not only did not lead to the growth and stability of political capital, but also eroded it. And vice versa: it is not difficult to recall situations in which the discrepancy between the type of political structure and the level of social development did not damage the political capital of the existing government and even contributed to its consolidation, albeit not always for a long time. Hence the urgent need to establish precisely the real causes of the dynamics of political capital, its intensity and direction.

I will dwell first of all on those that can be classified as objective to the greatest extent possible.

The degree of stability of political capital largely depends on the time and conditions of its emergence. From this point of view, it can be divided into three types. The most stable is the traditional political capital, rooted in the foundations that have developed over the centuries and fueled by long-standing ideological and confessional attitudes [8].

High, although less stable, is inherent in political capital, which took shape in the era of the formation and rise of regimes that arose at an early stage of capitalist relations, when active participation in the political process was the privilege of mainly the propertied classes.

Political capital of the third type, which has developed in modern times, has special properties - the so-called borrowed capital, which is based on a credit of trust granted by society to the authorities or their opponents. Borrowed political capital can be rational, based on a balanced assessment of the capabilities of a particular political force, or emotional, reflecting only the rejection of the existing order and the unbridled desire for change. However, in both cases, this is nothing more than an advance that needs to be consolidated. Naturally, he is the least stable.

One of the peculiarities of the current situation is that the public consciousness now presents, in various combinations, all three types of political capital. It is clear that this implies an ambiguous reaction of this consciousness to external impulses. Its traditional component not only rejects manipulative impulses of a subjective order, but also reacts with difficulty to real changes in the social organism. The smallest change in its positions requires at least a set of catastrophic upheavals. The second component is predominantly rational and pragmatic. It responds positively mainly to shifts that are obviously beneficial to it. Finally, the third component is most often "shy", reacts extremely nervously to negative stimuli and tends to change plus for minus in their views and behavior without much thought.

When evaluating political capital, it is necessary to fully take into account the fact that it usually represents a kind of average of political attitudes and preferences of a certain set of social groups, as well as established ideological and political ideas. In each of its structural elements, it is not difficult to detect—despite the general political choice—its own specific interpretation, which nuances the attitude to power, to its institutions and leaders, to their actions and decisions [10].

With some degree of certainty, one can speak of a connection between the amount and type of political capital and the susceptibility of society and individuals to impulses coming from above. In the presence of a significant amount of positive political capital, a significant part (or even the majority) of public associations and groups, as well as individuals, react to such impulses in the way (or approximately the way) that the power structures expect. The minority, immune to these impulses, is forced to follow them by force.

With the dominance of negative political capital, susceptibility decreases. Most individuals react to impulses coming from above in an inadequate way to the expectations of power. They either

transform them in such a way that they lose their original content, or they ignore them, often considering them as an incentive to protest.

Less obvious is the connection between negative political capital and the general behavior of individuals. By itself, the situation developing under these conditions does not give rise to mass political activity. Initially, as such capital accumulates, individual alienation from politics occurs. Then social irritation begins to grow, accompanied by despondency, a premonition of an impending catastrophe. Hence the tendency to escape from reality: mass drunkenness, drug addiction, etc.

If we take the concept of "political capital" seriously, then we should be aware that it has the same (or almost the same) features as other types of capital - monetary, social, intellectual [9].

A similar approach was used in the Middle Ages, and in the Modern and Contemporary times. Only the scale and sets of material and political "presents" changed. Now this method is called a social maneuver. It was he who established himself as the most important form of accumulation and retention of political capital in the most developed countries. For more than a century, their relative social stability has been based on it. There were, of course, repeated attempts to abandon such maneuvering, to "save" on social spending. But they invariably resulted in heavy material and political losses both for the countries involved in such games and for the political forces that stood at their origins.

Social maneuvering is usually carried out with the help of political means - through the activities of government bodies, the administrative apparatus, political parties, etc. In this sense, it can also be considered political. However, the political maneuver is much broader than the social one. It involves a wide range of measures designed to ensure the transformation of various interests (including those that contradict the needs of the existing system) into political orientations that contribute to (or at least do not prevent) its functioning and strengthening.

CONCLUSION

Can these measures reverse the dynamics of political power capital? This possibility cannot be categorically denied. It retained the bulk of political capital, primarily traditional, and it probably still has a lot of "ideas" in the stash. But the main thing is not even that. No convincing alternative has yet been offered to the current policy. Yes, and the forces (as well as the leaders) who claim to implement such an alternative involuntarily recall the characters of the children's puppet theater.

REFERENCES

1. Shevyakov A.Yu., Kiruta A.Ya. Inequality, economic growth and demography: unexplored relationships. M.: M-Studio, 2009. 192 p.
URL: <http://csl.isc.irk.ru/BD/Books/Demography.pdf>
2. Shevyakov A.Yu. Income inequality as a factor in economic and demographic growth // Innovations. 2011. No. 1. S. 7-19. URL: <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/v/neravenstvo-dohodov-kak-faktor-ekonomicheskogo-i-demograficheskogo-rosta>
3. Piketty T. Capital in the 21st century. M.: Ad Marginem, 2015. 592 p.
4. Lyubimov I. A look at the evolution of income inequality: Piketty vs. Kuznets — 60 years later // Economic Policy. 2016. V. 11. No. 1. S. 27-42.
URL: <https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2016-1-03>

5. Plyshevsky B. Accumulation of capital in the post-Soviet period // *The Economist*. 2016. No. 9. S. 22-36.
6. Ilyakova I.E., Suldina O.V. Inequality as a factor of socio-economic development in the context of European integration // *Competitiveness in the global world: economics, science, technology*. 2017. No. 1-2. pp. 50-53.
URL: https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/dcaed9_be2ced09a26346dfbaa7d5a79deb0f18.pdf
7. Anikin V., Tikhonova N. Poverty and inequality in the BRICS countries: Russian specifics // *Society and Economics*. 2016. No. 1. S. 78-114.
URL: <http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2016/0697/analit02.php>
8. Kormishkin E.D., Koroleva L.P., Ermoshina T.V. Estimation of public service financing models in EU countries // *Contentus*. 2016. No. 12. S. 63-68.
URL: <http://kontentus.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Kormishkin-Queen-Yermoshyna.pdf>
9. Lukyanchikova T., Yamshchikova T. Labor and capital: labor conflicts or social partnership // *The Economist*. 2017. No. 5. S. 77-88.
10. Sobolev E.N. Wages in the system of social and labor relations: stereotypes and Russian realities. M.: Institute of Economics RAS, 2017. 50 p. URL: https://inecon.org/docs/2017/Sobolev_paper_2017.pdf